Widely expected to recapture France's presidency and win a parliamentary majority in the 2017 elections, France's mainstream Right instead suffered a crushing and divisive defeat. A major reason for this was contingent: the selection of a candidate who three months before polling day was placed under investigation for embezzling public funds. Other reasons were more structural, in particular the progressive dislocation of the bipolar multipartism which had characterised France's party system for over four decades and the resultant strategic divisions within the Right. Although broadly chronological, this analysis of the long electoral cycle of 2016-17 assesses the respective importance of proximate and long-term factors in the Right's defeat.
experienced contenders for the succession and an apparently robust method of choosing between them. Excellent local implantation promised to bear fruit in the parliamentary election. Yet by June 2017, the mainstream Right's prospects were in tatters: its presidential candidate eliminated in the first round -a first under the Fifth Republic -, its National Assembly representation cut by 40 per cent, and its unity shattered by the impact of a new president bent on 'recomposing' the party system. That President Emmanuel Macron had plucked the new prime minister, two key economic ministers, and two secretaries of state from LR was no consolation; for they became outcasts from their party.
Was the defeat structural or circumstantial? The structural context was the mainstream Right's limited popularity; the rise and consolidation of the FN; the resultant strategic tensions within LR/UDI, squeezed between far Right and Centre; and the unpredictable dynamic of the primaries. These considerations did not make defeat inevitable -the mainstream Right had won three of the five presidential elections since the FN's emergence in the mid-1980s -but they ruled out any automatic victory. Circumstance did the rest. It was the nomination as presidential candidate, however procedurally unimpeachable, of President Sarkozy's former prime minister, François Fillon, which turned an unpredictable electoral cycle into an unforeseeable disaster.
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Poised for power? LR/UDI in 2016
A year earlier, LR/UDI had appeared poised for power. One reason for this was negative: after January 2016 fewer than one in ten poll respondents expressed satisfaction with President Hollande's record (CEVIPOF, 2016-17, vague 14) . As the President slid towards the abyss, the mainstream Right began its recovery from the two anni horribili that had followed the defeats of May-June 2012 (Knapp, 2014) .
Most obviously, the UMP/UDI started winning again. In the 2014 municipal elections they won 572 out of France's 932 towns of over 10,000 inhabitants, a net gain of 139.
A year later they won control of 66 out of France's 101 départements (45 to the UMP, 14 to the UDI, and seven to non-aligned right-wingers labelled as divers droite), a net The real situation was less rosy. Membership, having risen, stuck at 150,000, far short of Sarkozy's stated goal of 400,000 (France Inter, Interceptions, 8 November 2015; Le Figaro, 14 December 2016) . Meanwhile, quarterly SOFRES polls showed poor opinions of the UMP/LR outnumbering favourable ones by an average of nearly 27 per cent across Hollande's presidency, an even worse score than that of the Socialists. Polls since at least 2010 showed the dominant feelings towards politics in general to be 'mistrust' and 'disgust' (CEVIPOF, 2017): a crisis, by no means confined to France (Pharr and Putnam, 2000) , summarised by the pollster Brice Teinturier as 'Nothing left to do, nothing to do with us' (Teinturier, 2017) . The problem was that LR, despite its successes, failed to break out of this ambient hostility.
The party's ongoing scandals hardly helped. These were scarcely new, as Philippe Madelin (2001) has demonstrated. Even in 1946, General de Gaulle, tutelary ancestor of LR, had said 'I don't like Gaullists because they are too fond of money' (Lacouture, 1985, p. 249) . The issue that got Jean-François Copé, UMP president since December 2012, replaced by the temporary triumvirate of May 2014 was the illegal financing of Sarkozy's 2012 campaign, and in particular the use of a firm, Bygmalion, to charge a large overspend on public meetings to the UMP -illegally.
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Bygmalion also poisoned the party internally, since Sarkozy claimed that Copé had organised fake invoices for his own purposes. Other investigations into the UMP concerned presidential campaigns as far back as 1995, as well as close advisers to Sarkozy who were also pollsters and who had awarded themselves generous contracts for opinion surveys paid for by the Élysée. No change of brand could wipe clean this kind of dirt.
Even when it won elections, the UMP/LR attracted a mediocre vote share that barely measured up to the FN's in the first round (see Table 1 ). Only by adding in the UDI, the divers droite, and the hard-right Eurosceptics of Nicolas Dupont-Aignan's Debout la France, did the 'moderate' Right clearly outnumber its extreme adversary.
Second round vote totals looked better because many left-wing voters rallied, where necessary, to the mainstream Right in a 'republican front' to defeat the FN; but this was a far cry from the UMP's founding ambition of 2002. whether to pitch openly for far-right votes, as Sarkozy had usually done since 2007, or to reaffirm the political, economic and moral differences separating the two sides of the Right, on the assumption that elections were still won at the centre. This dilemma, reinforcing and reinforced by personal clashes, had divided the mainstream Right since the FN's early breakthroughs in 1983-84, but had grown in intensity since Yet it was Fillon who on 27 November, by a two-thirds majority in the second round, was nominated the official candidate of LR/UDI (see Table 2 ). Probably not even Fillon himself had expected this outcome. Six explanations may be offered. In several respects the primary had been a resounding success. Fair and wellmanaged, unlike the 2012 contest for the party presidency, it had attracted both media attention (in four televised debates) and some nine per cent of all registered voters. It had produced a clear result. And the two-euro contributions translated into a net profit to LR of some nine million euros. One shortcoming was immediately identifiable: the primary had attracted far more well-off retired voters than ordinary wage-earners (IFOP, 2016b) . A second failure took longer to emerge: the voters had unwittingly made a disastrous choice.
The fall of Fillon, December 2016-April 2017
In early December 2016, with Marine Le Pen apparently guaranteed a place in the second-round run-off but unelectable, the Socialists in disarray, and Macron an unknown quantity, Fillon was odds-on favourite to be France's next president. His victory in the primary, followed by his publication of a book on 'Islamic totalitarianism' (Fillon, 2016) Fillon himself had placed his own integrity at the heart of his primary campaign.
Nearly two-thirds of the French put honesty and probity at the head of the qualities they required in a president (IPSOS, 2017a ). Yet his alleged offences looked worse than those of Sarkozy and Juppé, whose misdeeds were limited to political finance; for Fillon appeared simply to have lined his own pockets, and his family's. France, which had no direct links to LR, was hardly a real party. In the end DupontAignan and Boutin remained isolated. Still, an external organisation had rallied to an FN candidate for the first time in 45 years; to that extent, a taboo had been broken.
The second round of the presidential contest now offered a full-sized, national demonstration of the attractiveness of Marine Le Pen to voters of the mainstream Right (see Table 3 Chirac, by contrast, had gained nearly 20 million votes thanks to Left and Centre voters, and former abstentionists, who mobilised against a candidate seen as a danger to democracy. These reflexes were far less effective in 2017, when the mainstream Right rather than the Left had been eliminated. Marine Le Pen gained nearly three million votes, and over 12 percentage points, between the two rounds; Macron's gains were correspondingly less impressive than Chirac's. Le Pen drew second-round support from the hard Left, whose candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, had not endorsed Macron, and from the Socialist Benoît Hamon, who had; but the largest group (see Table 4) came from the mainstream Right. Only half of Fillon voters followed the party's call to defeat Le Pen, over a quarter abstained, and at least a fifth switched to the FN candidate. Dupont-Aignan voters were fewer but, logically, more inclined to support Le Pen. Table 4 thus illustrates the dilemma of France's mainstream right. LR cannot afford to push its FN leaners into the arms of Le Pen; but undue efforts to placate them would lose support to the Centre, and especially to such an apparently attractive proposition as Macron's La République en Marche (LRM). That was also to be LR's problem in the parliamentary election. 
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The extension of the parliamentary-level split into a full-scale division into two parties now appeared highly likely.
Conclusion: the Right and Recomposition
The new president's aim was to reconfigure the whole party system and govern France from the centre. When Valéry Giscard d 'Estaing (1985) had attempted this forty years earlier, the Left-Right division in French politics had corresponded to profound divisions among voters (Capdevielle et al., 1981, pp. 251-56) ; by the twenty-first century, this was less true and the context correspondingly more promising. Bipolar multipartism had become more vulnerable to crises within the established parties, to accidents, and to determined attacks from outside. 
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